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Abstract: Since their introduction in 1982, Japanese auto transplants in the u.s. have 
skyrocketed in production, now producing many more cars than are imported. This study 
incorporates new refinements and revisions to attempt to identify the main factors that are 
responsible for the introduction ofJapanese auto transplants and their massive growth in 
production over the last 14 years. The author develops two hypothesesjrom theoretical analysis 
of the factors contributing to production decisions. The first is that the voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) imposed on the Japanese from 1981-1985 are responsible for bringing the 
transplants to the U.S. andfor creating major growth in their production. The second 
hypothesis is that after 1985, a different factor was responsible for sustaining growth in 
transplant production, the exchange rate. The author relies mainly on theory and observations 
ofquarterly time series data to support his first hypothesis, but supports the second hypothesis 
with both theoretical and improved empirical analyses, with strong results throughout. 
I. Introduction 
Of the many industries in which the U.S. trades internationally, few can match the fervor 
created by the automobile industry. More specifically, the rivalry between US. and Japanese cars 
has historically been one of the hottest debated topics across the United States, and not 
surprisingly, a very personal issue for the thousands of Americans employed in the U.S. big three 
auto makers (Chrysler, Ford and General Motors) and their many parts suppliers. After the oil 
crisis in 1973, Japanese cars became extremely popular because of their fuel efficient designs and 
excellent reliability, leaving the American auto industry shaken. They lost market share quickly, 
unprepared for the changing demand in automobiles and lagging behind the Japanese in quality. 
This loss in market share continued into the 1980s, creating great concern among those employed 
in the auto industry, as well as the many Americans who shared a sense of pride in American cars. 
This passionate sense of pride among staunch U.S. automobile protectionists led to pressure on 
the government by unions and other organizations to protect the welfare of the U.S. auto 
industry. Most protection has come in the form of tariffs or quotas on imports. In early 1980, 
fueled by concern over the U.S. auto industry's loss in market share, the US. government asked 
Japan to impose voluntary export restraints (YERs) of 1.68 million units on its automobiles to the 
United States from 1982 until 1984. Japan announced in May 1981 that it would comply with the 
request. 
While the YERs temporarily boosted and protected the US. auto industry's market share, 
the YERs caused another significant effect that was certainly unintended by the U.S. government. 
Sales of Japanese cars actually increased in the coming years because major Japanese auto makers 
started up domestic production in the United States. This paper examines the reasons for 
increased Japanese auto production in the United States. 
This paper hypothesizes that the YERs of the early 1980s were largely responsible for the 
introduction of Japanese domestic production in U. S. auto transplants and, until 1985, for their 
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explosive growth. Although the United States-requested VERs expired in 1985 and import 
restrictions loosened greatly, Japanese production in the United States persisted at a heightened 
pace while exports continually declined over the years following 1986 (Figure 1). The number of 
exports depicted in Figure 1 exceed the VER quota because these figures include trucks, vehicles 
not covered under the VERs. The author hypothesizes that after the VERs expired, the reason 
for Japanese companies' decisions to continue domestic production changed. The appreciated yen 
that skyrocketed after 1985 (Figure 2) became the factor responsible for this persistent growth. 
Section II will present background information on the research by discussing the related 
economic literature. Section ill will discuss the theoretical framework in this project. Section IV 
will describe the sources of data and the data used in the empirical model in Section V. Section 
VI will discus the results and the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations for 
future research in Section VII. 
ll. Backgroun 
While many authors such as Goto, Collyns and Dunaway, de Melo and Tare, Krugman and 
Richardson acknowledge VERs and the exchange rate as a major reason for increased Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. transplants, virtually no one has performed a study to 
examine the VER's or the yen-dollar exchange rate's direct roles in influencing domestic 
production decisions. Graham and Krugman acknowledge both of my hypotheses as being true in 
their book, Foreign Direct Investment, but give no support for their assertion. Most literature 
about the VERs of the early eighties seeks to quantify the monetary/welfare costs associated with 
the quotas. These costs were incurred because Japanese companies were able to reap monopoly 
profits by the restricted supply (Figure 3). In addition, Japanese companies were able to 
raise their prices effectively and increase profitability by exporting more well-equipped cars than 
before (Collyns 151). U. S. companies were also able to raise their prices and make more profits 
although to a lesser extent (Collyns 159). These additional costs to the consumer in the form of 
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inflated prices was the cost ofthe trade restraints. 
Literature by Ries suggests that the VERs had a positive aspect for the Japanese 
companies because of the windfall profits associated with the restricted exports (Rjes 259). A 
study by de Melo and Tarr also found that the Japanese companies experienced increased profits 
because of the VERs. Tllis would suggest that moving operations to the United States in order to 
boost production would not be wise since they were earning inflated profits with their restricted 
supply, contrary to my hypothesis. It is important to point out that although it may be true that 
Japanese companies profited during the times of the VERs, this literature focuses only on the 
period oftime willie VERs were at their highest (1982-1985), not on the long run picture. In 
focusing only on the short run, this literature has neglected the important issue that in the 
automobile industry, the long run view is crucial to the success of any company. Tllis is because 
it is an industry in willch established market share is hard to gain and is very important. In the 
next section on theory, I will better address these arguments and discuss why Japanese companies 
decided to move production to the United States while apparently earning increased profits 
because of the VERs. 
It seems clear that with a void of literature focusing directly on the research problem, the 
project will be breaking new ground and focus on support by theoretical and empirical evidence 
rather than past research. 
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m. Theoretical Model 
The model will include six main factor that have affected the Japanese companies' 
production decisions in U.S. auto transplants the most. These main explanatory ariables are: ]) 
the VERs 2) the exchange rate, 3) wage rates in U.S. and Japanese auto industries, 4) U.S. 
economic perfonnance, 5) market share of Japanese automobiles in the United States and 6) parts 
availability for producing the automobiles. In this section, I develop a theoretical model that uses 
these variables to explain the introduction and rise of Japanese domestic production in U.S. auto 
transplants. 
J) The VERs 
Underlying all analysis presented in this paper is the assumption that the Japanese auto 
producers are profit maximizers. Even though a short run deci ion may create short run windfall 
profits, as is the situation of the period ofVERs (Ries 259), it may not create the highest profits. 
in the long run because the restricted supply results in loss of market share and, therefore, may 
not be the best decision. In a dynamic sense, domestic production must be more profitable for the 
Japanese companies or else they would not have made the shift in production. 
During the period of VERs, imports were limited at 1.68 million cars from 1981-1983, 
and 1.85 million cars in 1984 and 1985. Although VERs officially continued after 1985 at the 
level of2.3 million cars, they did not have a significant effect on automakers' decisions because 
import levels were well below the VER level of2.3 million units. As pointed out previously, 
Japanese car were in high demand in the early 1980s, just as the VERs took effect. Under the 
VERs, Japanese companies were faced with a fixed supply under rising demand. This situation 
led to higher prices for the automobiles, but does this mean profitability went up as some suggest? 
After gaining market share of 21. 8% in 1981 from only 12.2% of the industry sales three years 
earlier, Japanese automobiles were clearly in rising demand. A study by Collyns and Dunaway 
(1987) indicated that sales of Japanese automobiles would have been 45% higher over the entire 
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period of VERs in the absence of the restrictions. It therefore seems very likely that the profits 
Japanese companies were losing from a deficit in sales more than outweighed any monopoly 
profits earned because of the VERs. Being profit maximizers, Japanese companies recognized 
this big problem and searched for a way to supply more cars to the United States. Furthermore, 
the Japanese companies did not know whether the restrictions would be lifted or increased 
further, putting more pressure on their future earnings. Their answer was to create U.S. 
transplants and they quickly began to move production overseas to build cars exempt from the 
VERs, Honda being the first in 1982, closely followed by others (Table 1). The VERs seem to be 
the main motivating factor in bringing production overseas. 
Table 1 Japanese Automobile Assembly plants in U.S. 
Japanese ompany Location Start year 
Honda Marysville, Ohio 1982 
Nissan Smyrna, Tennessee 1983 
N1JM1vfI (Joint venture, Toyota and GM) Fremont, California 1984 
Mazda Flat Rock, Michigan 1987 
Toyota Georgetown, Kentucky 1988 
Diamond Star (Mitsubishi & Chrysler) Nonnal, Illinois 1988 
Subaru-Isuzu Lafayette, Indiana 1989 
Nissan-Ford Avon Lake, Ohio 1991 
Source: Kennev and Florida, ''Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. 1/ 
2) The Exchange Rate 
ntil 1985, the dollar enjoyed a strong position against the Japanese yen, but after 1985, 
the yen appreciated rapidly and has continued in that direction ever since (Table 2). Although 
economic theory would suggest that under an appreciated dollar, it would be less attractive for 
foreign companies to invest in the United States, we observed considerable growth in FDI in 
Japanese auto transplants that started in 1982 and has continued ever since then. While the VER 
was the main motivating factor in bringing Japanese nameplates to U.S. transplants in the early 
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eighties, manufacturers' incentives changed gears after 1985. After 1985, VERs expired yet fOUf 
more transplant operations opened their doors. The problem for the profit maximizing Japanese 
companies was no longer a restricted supply, but rather an appreciated yen. With a stronger yen, 
it takes more dollars to purchase products imported from Japan. In other words, Japanese goods 
would be more expensive relative to domestic goods. If importing the automobiles from Japan, 
companies would have to increase their prices to maintain the same income because of the 
exchange rate difference, but by doing this, they risk lowering their sales. Although the Japanese 
were superior to the United States in cost-cutting manufacturing methods, trying to battle the 
effects of the appreciated yen and remain profitable was a sizable challenge (Collyns 1987, 
Crandall 1987). By moving production to the United States, Japanese companies effectively 
eliminated many of the exchange rate problems associated with importing the automobiles. They 
could take advantage of materials and labor that were relatively cheaper for them because of the 
strength of their currency, and thus control the prices of their automobiles. 
The trend was clear. Before 1985, Japanese companies acted against what economic 
theory about exchange rates suggests firms would do. Constrained by the VERs, they invested 
heavily in the U.S. although their currency was weak, but after 1985, the behavior of the Japanese 
firms clearly complies with investment theory. The VERs were highly instrumental in bringing 
production ofJapanese autos to the U. S., to the point ofoutweighing the effects of the 
unfavorable exchange rate, and the appreciated yen has been highly instrumental in sustaining 
their growth in domestic production. This trend will be supported by empirical data later in the 
paper. 
3) Real wage in each country's auto industry 
Labor costs are obviously a very important consideration for automobile companies since 
they account for a large part of manufacturing costs. As profit maximizing companies, the 
Japanese companies would want to produce where the labor was the cheapest, unless other 
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benefits outweighed a higher labor cost. Table 2 shows a comparison between the wages in the 
United States and Japan measured with indices that control the exchange rate. The ratio of the 
two indices shows this relationship As the number decreases, wages are either increasing in 
Japan or decreasing in the United States. By looking at the indices, one can easily see that wages 
have risen much more quickly in Japan than in the United States. In fact, until recently, wages in 
the United States remained quite constant willIe wages in Japan have risen almost every year. 
Wages have been pushed up in Japan over the last decade largely because of a labor shortage 
there. This situation makes producing autos in the US. ideal for the Japanese companies. As the 
ratio of wages has been getting smaller, the amount of Japanese nameplate autos produced in the 
United States has been getting larger. Therefore, the wage rate may also be an important factor 
that is responsible for the growing transplant production in the United States. 
Although productivity considerations are important for companies, this measure is left out 
of my paper. This is for two reasons. First, a suitable and reliable productivity measure, such as 
unit labor cost is difficult to obtain. Second, I feel comfortable in leaving tills measure out 
because studies have shown (Kenney and Florida 1991, Goto 1990) that Japanese companies have 
been highly successful in transferring their efficient production methods to the United States.. 
Kenney and Florida noted nearly identical productivity in the Honda plant in the U.S. as in Japan. 
Therefore, productivity may not be much of an issue for Japanese companies deciding whether or 
not to move production to the U. S. 
4) U.S. Real CDP 
Automobiles are a big-ticket durable good so they are highly sensitive to changes in the 
overall state of the economy. Theory would suggest that we would observe lags in production 
when the economy is at its worst and boosts in production when it is healthy. For example, in a 
recession, many consumers are uneasy about their current financial state and will not make a large 
investment in an automobile, whereas during a period of high consumer confidence, buyers will be 
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more likely to make a large purchase. However, in the U.S. auto transplants, production has 
increased every year, some years at an incredible pace, ev n through recessions. Although 
growth rates are not consistent with the growth rates of the economy, one can see by observing 
Table 2 Comparison of Real Wages in Auto Industries ofD.S. and Japan 
Year u.s. (1979=100) Japan 0979=100) Index Ratio 
1979 100 100 1 
1980 108.68 106.27 1.023 
1981 105.11 107.52 .978 
1982 105.16 110 .956 
1983 103.22 111.38 .927 
1984 102.68 112.42 .913 
1985 t03.17 113.25 .911 
1986 102.13 115.96 .881 
1987 101.74 116.55 .873 
1988 100.89 121.34 .831 
1989 98.61 122.22 .807 
1990 97.02 121.68 .797 
1991 97.57 128.7 .758 
1992 98.07 132.27 .741 
1993 101.88 126.32 .807 
1994 105.26 125.35 .840 
Source: Ward's Automotive Yearbook. Multiple Volumes. data adjusted for inflation with CPl (}987 -100) 
figure 4 that the general trends of the growth rates in domestic Japanese production at least 
somewhat follow the trends of the economy, especially during the recession of 1990 and 1991 
when transplant production plunged. The inconsistencies in the growth pattern of Japanese auto 
production in the u.s. as compared to the growth pattern of the economy can be mostly 
explained by three main factors: 1) demand for Japanese cars has been high 2) Japanese 
companies have relied more and more on domestic production in U.S. transplants to meet the 
needs of the U.S. market, and 3) during this time Japanese companies were in the process of 
setting up new factories that would obviously cause a great growth in production as they started 
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up operations for the first time. 
With the first factor, it has already been established that Japanese cars were in high 
demand. With such a high demand, we would expect to see them less affected than less desirable 
cars by changes in the economy. The second factor is important in explaining why growth rates 
of transplant production have been much more active than growth in the economy. As noted 
before, the Japanese have been exporting fewer cars to the United States each year and producing 
more domestically since 1986 (see Figure 1). These increases in local production are therefore 
not only an indicator of high demand for Japanese cars but also of the companies' new found 
reliance on domestic production to meet the needs of the North American market because it is 
more profitable for them to produce here. Regardless of economic trends, the Japanese were 
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producing more of their cars in the United States and less in Japan. The third factor is very 
obvious. Once a new transplant started production, there would be a sudden increase in the 
number of cars produced, making the growth rate appear abnormally high for that year or the 
next. Years ofmassive growth such as ]985 and 1989 are evidence of this effect. NUMMI 
started in 1984 and Diamond Star, Toyota, and Subaru-Isuzu all started in 1988 and 1989 and 
account for the observed abnormally high growth rates. 
5) Market Share 
To further address the issue of whether the Japanese profited by the VERs, one must 
consider the implications oflosing market share in the auto industry. Ries, de Melo, and Tarr did 
not consider the importance of market share in their study in which they concluded that Japanese 
companies profited by the VERs. Since automobiles are products that are frequently very brand 
loyal buyer's items, aut0 makers' play close attention to market share which can be considered a 
rough proxy for preference of automobiles. Once a person purchases a car, assuming the 
experience was positive, they are more likely to purchase that brand of car again rather than 
another car. Under VERs, Japanese market share was restricted meaning some customers who 
would have purchased a Japanese car ended up substituting with an American one. This loss in 
market share is difficult to recover. Since these VERs hit at a time when demand for Japanese 
cars was just tarting to explode (see Figure 1), the Japanese had no choice but to respond by 
shifting production overseas to avoid the VERs and regain profits and market share. 
Another important aspect to consider is that with a limited number of exports, companies 
could not expand their product line offerings without reducing the exports of another model. 
Moving production of the most popular high-volume cars to the U.S., such as Toyota's Corolla or 
Nissan's Sentra, freed up space under the quota and allowed the Japanese to continue plans to 
offer new imports such as luxury cars, sports cars, and sport utility vehicles without 
compromising the sales of other models. Observation of this trend is the fact that the total 
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production of the Japanese companies has increased greatly with more types of models offered 
than ever. The current trend is that most high volume cars are now produced in the U.S. while 
the more expensive models are reserved for production in Japan. 
Once the Japanese regained their market share, we would expect to see them continue to 
try to increase their market share, not level off. This is because, as profit maximizing companies, 
they would have an incentive to continue to increase their sales and earn more profits. In other 
words, when the going is good, the good keep going, which is certainly the case we see with 
Japanese auto makers who hold about 30% of the US. car market now, about double what they 
held fifteen years earlier (Ward's 1996). 
6) Parts availability 
In Japan, auto producers utilize a close-knit system of suppliers. Within this system, 
suppliers who meet the needs of the Japanese companies' unique work organization are highly 
reliant on just-in-time (llT) inventory systems. The requirements of suppliers under this system 
are much more demanding than traditional US. auto manufacturing. In the early 1980s, many 
US. suppliers were inadequate for the Japanese transplants because they lacked the knowledge or 
experience with this type of work organization or llT, or they were just unwilling to comply 
(Florida and Kenney 106). We would then expect this to be a factor that discourages Japanese 
companies from manufacturing here. What is observed by Florida and Kenney (1991) is that 
many Japanese companies have strongly encouraged their suppliers in Japan to set up shop in the 
United States in order to meet their needs. These suppliers, together with the growing number of 
US. companies that accommodate the Japanese organization, make up the first-tier suppliers for 
the Japanese, allowing them to manufacture successfully in the United States. This development 
has been highly significant in attracting domestic Japanese production. 
Before Japanese parts suppliers moved to the United States and U.S. companies adapted 
to a llT system, the Japanese imported their engines and drivetrains already assembled. They 
12
 
would in some instances essentially ship disassembled cars over that simply needed to be "screwed 
together" to be ready for sale. This system worked well for the Japanese because while VERs 
were at their highest, there were never any restrictions on parts imports. Although this system 
was not as efficient as the supplier networks transplants utilize now, this alternative was the best 
for Japanese companies to increase supply while under the restrictions of the VERs. Since then, 
the Japanese companies producing in the United States now take advantage of the favorable 
exchange rate and improved supplier network and use many more U. S. made parts in their 
automobiles (Florida and Kenney 109). 
IV. Data Sources and Description 
Quarterly time series data from 1980, fourth quarter to 1994 are used in the empirical 
model. This period was chosen because it starts two years before transplant production began 
and ends with the most recent data available. Data utilized in this project were acquired 
overwhelmingly from yearly volumes ofWard's Automotive Yearbook. These specific data 
include transplant production, number of imports, market share, and automotive industry wage 
rates. Data about the U.S. economy were extracted from the websites of the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (US BEA) and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, the 1995 edition ofWorld 
Tables and the 1995 edition of Business Statistics of the U.S. Exchange rate data were also 
acquired from the website of the US BEA. Finding detailed parts supplier data that indicate their 
country of origin and main customers proved to be a huge task beyond the scope of this paper, as 
Kenney and Florida indicated in their research (107). Hence, this paper will have to rely simply 
on a theoretical analysis of the parts suppliers issue, without empirical data to support the theory. 
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V. Empirical Model 
From the theory section, two main hypotheses emerge: 
1) The VER was the factor responsible for bringing Japanese production 
to the U.S. and, until 1985 when they expired, for the explosive growth in 
production. 
2) The appreciation of the yen after 1985, coinciding with the expiration of 
the VERs, took over as the main factor that sustained and increased growth 
in domestic production of Japanese cars in U.S. transplants. 
This section presents the empirical model indicated by theory. The same variables discussed in 
theory will be incorporated in the model with the exception of the parts variable for reasons 
described earlier. An OLS multiple regression analysis is used to determine whether the variables 
explain the hypotheses that are supported by theory. The regression equation takes the form: 
PRODUCTIONT.RM,sPLANTs= exo + PIVER + P2YEN/$(VER)+ P3WAGE + P4GDP + PsMKT 
Below, each variable is discussed individually in accordance with the two hypotheses put forward 
earlier. Table 3 defines the variables of the regression equation. 
Independent Variable 1: VER 
A dummy variable was utilized in the regression analysis to capture the effects of a VER. 
Before a VER is implemented, maximum exports were theoretically determined by total u.s. 
demand for new cars. Although there were production capacity limits, the companies were 
allowed to export all the cars they wanted without a VER. While under the VER, a company had 
a specified limit on automobiles they could import. In a nut shell, either it was on or it was off A 
value of zero was given for years in bich there was a VER, and a value of one was given for 
years in which a VER was not in effect. These values were chosen 
because the next variable, YEN/$, is an interactive variable that utilizes the VER variable to turn 
the variable on only during the period of no VERs. The importance of this will be explained fully 
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in the description of the Yen!$ variable. 
The VER variable was lagged by two years, or eight quarters, in the equation. A lag was 
incorporated in the equation because it takes time for companies to set up a factory in the states 
and begin production. A lag of two years returned the best results for both this variable and the 
others. The expected sign of this variable is negative. While restricted by the VERs, we expect 
to see Japanese companies producing more in US. auto transplants because of their profit 
confining supply shortages, than when they are not restricted. 
Table 3 Variable Definitions and their Expected Signs 
Variable Tvpe	 Explanation Expected Sign 
PRODUCTIONTRANSPLAA'TS Dependent	 Number of Japanese nameplate 
autos produced in U. S. transplants. 
VER Independent Dummy variable indicating when Negative 
VERs were in effect. Takes on value 
of 0 during VERs, 1 with no VERs. 
YEN/$(VER) Independent Interactive variable that measures the Negative 
Yen!$ exchange rate during the period 
of no VERs. The value of this variable 
is multiplied by the value of the VER 
variable, effectively turning off the 
variable during the period of VERs and 
turning it on during the period of no VERs 
to isolate the production period hypothesized 
to be most affected by the exchange rate. 
WAGE Independent	 US./Japan ratio constructed with indices Negative 
of real domestic wages in auto production 
industries of US. and Japan 
GDP Independent	 Real US. GDP in constant 1987 dollars. Positive 
MKT Independent	 Japanese companies' market share of Positive 
all automobiles sold in the US. 
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Independent Variable 2: YEN/$(VER) 
This interactive variable measures the effects of the Yen/$ exchange rate after the period 
of VERs, a factor hypothesized to greatly influence production in the United States. Since I 
hypothesize that this vaIiable is responsible for increases in production only after the period of 
VERs, this variable is effectively turned off during the period of VERs through this interaction. 
Since the VER variable takes on the value of zero during VERs and one during non VER years, 
the variable is only activated during the period of non-VER years. This interaction effect is very 
important in supporting the hypothesis since it isolates the period in question. 
This variable was lagged two years like the VER variable for the same reasons. Exchange 
rates move very quickly and companies deciding to produce in the U.S. because of the more 
favorable exchange rate needed time to set up and produce in the states. Furthermore, since 
exchange rates can be rather volatile, companies would want to observe the patterns of the 
exchange rate for a while before making a major decision like moving production overseas. 
Companies like Toyota, Subaru-Isuzu, and Mitsubishi all arrived about two years after the yen 
appreciated greatly. Expected sign of this variable is negative because as the Yen/$ exchange rate 
increases (more yen to buy a dollar), it would be more expensive to produce in the United States 
and companies would choose to produce where it is cheapest. 
Independent Variable 3: WAGE 
WAGE is a ratio that measures the level of wages in the auto industries of the U. S. and 
Japan against one another. This variable is included because labor is a major factor cost in 
producing automobiles and affects decisions to produce in the United States. Since an increase in 
the value ofthis variable indicates either wages are increasing in the United States or decreasing 
in Japan, the expected sign of this coefficient is negative. This is because ifU.S. wages increase 
relative to Japanese wages, we would hypothesize that this would cause the Japanese companies 
to produce where labor is cheaper (in Japan), thus inhibiting transplant production and resulting in 
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a negative sign. 
Independent Variable 4: GDP 
GDP was included in the regression equation because, as explained in the theory section, 
demand for big-ticket durable good, like automobiles, is affected by the state of the economy. 
Therefore, this variable had to be included to control for changes in production caused by changes 
in the state of the economy. The expected sign for this variable is positive, since one would 
expect to see more vehicles being demanded with a healthy economy. This variable was not 
lagged because the auto industry responds immediately to changes in demand for autos by 
adjusting production accordingly. Furthermore, GDP does not need to be lagged because it was 
not responsible for bringing transplants to the US, but it has affected production decisions in 
them and needs to be included in the model. 
Independent Variable 5: MKT 
MKT is the Japanese automakers' market share of all cars sold in the United States. This 
variable was also lagged two years in the regression. The MKT variable was included in the 
regression because, as explained earlier in the theory section, market share is a very important 
consideration for automobile companies because it can be considered a rough proxy for 
preference in automobiles. The expected sign for this variable is positive. While arguments can 
be made for causality to run both ways, i.e. for increases in production to cause increases in 
market share, or increases in market share to fuel increases in production, I will be arguing the 
latter. First of all, as market share increases, Japanese companies are obviously selling more 
vehicles. These increases in production allow companies to take advantage of economies of scale. 
Since many of the costs of producing an automobile are fixed, such as start up costs with the 
factories and operational costs of running the factory, additional automobiles can be produced 
cheaper as production increases. In other words, the costs can be spread over more and more 
automobiles and profits can be maximized. Also, as people's preferences for Japanese 
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automobiles increases, i.e. as their market share increases, Japanese companies would respond by 
increasing their production to meet the demand and expand their market share. 
VL Results 
The regression was corrected for auto correlation with the Hildreth-Lu method and run 
with OLS estimation. The results of the equation are given in Table 4. The analysis returned 
mixed results, with aU variables but one resulting in the predicted sign. All variables are 
significant and the adjusted R squared is high, at .94. The results ofeach variable and how they 
apply to the hypotheses will be discussed in this section of the paper. 
Hypothesis one was not supported by the results of this model. The VER variable 
returned with a coefficient of265922.81, the wrong sign, and was significant. Tills result means 
that under the VERs, the model predicts that the Japanese produced about 265,922 Jess autos in 
the US. than they would have without the VERs. Although tills result was unexpected, it is not 
necessarily disappointing. 
Tills unexpected result may be explained by re-examining US. transplant production 
(Figure 1). VERs were in effect 1981,82,83,84, and 85. With the two year lag incorporated in 
the model, the observed years with VERs are therefore 1983, 84, 85, 86, and 87. A look at the 
production figures shows that although during the period of VERs we see significant growth in 
transplant production, the non-VER years following 1987 have even greater growth in 
production. Tills observation is a reflection of the increased number of producers in the non-VER 
years than in VER years. By 1989, there were seven different transplants in production, but in 
1987, only fOUf were operating. With three more transplants in production after the period of 
VERs, obviously there would be more production than before. 
With that said, it still does not explain why the results do not support the hypothesis that 
the VERs brought production to the US. and caused growth in production. For support of tills 
hypothesis, one must look at the statistics and rely on theory and the literature of other 
18
 
Table 4 Regression Results 
Independent Variables 
VER 
Estimated Coefficient 
265922.81 
(5.2617)* 
YEN/$(VER) -1090.71 
(4.9434)* 
WAGE -208729.23 
(6.3095)* 
GDP 65.17 
(21.7502)* 
MKT 11502.18 
(6.3043)* 
Constant -291790.90 
(11.9766)* 
Adjusted R2 .94 
Durbin-Watson 1.87 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
* indicates significance at .0001 level 
researchers more than the results of this model. Let us take this in steps. First of all, it is clear 
that before the VE s there was no transplant production and during the VER period, four 
transplants came to the US. Next, it seems obvious that the Japanese companies were not 
moving to the US. during the early eighties because of the exchange rate. During that time, the 
high Yen/$ exchange rate made production in the US. more expensive than production in Japan. 
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With these two important observations and the previous discussion in the paper in mind, I still 
maintain that the VERs were responsible for bringing the first four transplants to the U.S. and 
creating growth in transplant production. 
A favorable exchange rate for the Japanese that almost perfectly coincided with the 
expiration of the VERs made transplant production more attractive and led to the introduction of 
new companies and even greater growth in production than before. So yes, there was less 
production in VER years than in non-VER years, as the model predicted, but this result does not 
completely reject the hypothesis. Although production was smaller during VERs, it seems that 
they were still responsible for bringing over at least four transplants and for the growth in 
production in those plants during the VERs. 
Hypothesis two, however, was upheld very well by the empirical model. The exchange 
rate returned with a coefficient of -1090.71 and is significant at the. 000 1 level. While the 
coefficient appears to be small, the model predicts that an increase in the yen/$ exchange rate of 
one yen per dollar results in a decrease of transplant production of 1091 cars. One yen is a very 
smaJl amount of money, about a penny. To put this in better perspective, the model predicts that 
from 1985 to 1986, when the yen appreciated suddenly, production in transplants increased by 
76,500 cars solely because of the rapid appreciation of the yen, a significant amount. 
The wage rate also returned with a coefficient of the predicted sign, but with a larger 
coefficient of -208729.23, also significant at the .0001 level. The model predicts that an increase 
in the ratio of wages of one (which indicates a doubling of the U.S. wages relative to Japanese 
wages) would result in a reduction of production of about 209,000 cars in one year, ceteris 
paribus. Since labor is a major factor cost in manufacturing an automobile, it seems that the 
Japanese companies have placed a lot of importance on the relative wage rate when making 
production decisions, more than the author originally expected. An important observation of this 
result is that this model predicts that relative wage was significant during the entire production 
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span of the transplants, not just after the VERs expired. Therefore, relative wage seems to have 
influenced production decisions even during the period of VERs, an unexpected result. Despite 
this reservation, these two factors, the Yenl$ exchange rate and the real wage rates in each 
country, both are supported as being very important factors in determining u.s. transplant 
production decisions, with the Yenl$ exchange rate significant only after the VERs expired. 
The GDP variable was very significant with a coefficient of 65. 17. The model predicts 
that an increase of a dollar in the real GDP of the U. S. results in an increase of transplant 
production of about 65 cars. This small coefficient indicates that in and of itself, the state of the 
economy is not influencing the large growth in U.S. auto transplant production, unlike the other 
variables, but the high significance is evidence that production trends are affected by the state of 
the economy, exactly as was hypothesized. 
Finally, the MKT variable also was highly significant and had a coefficient of 11502.18. 
With each percentage point gained in market share, the model predicts that production increased 
by about 11,502 cars. As preference leaned towards Japanese automobiles and their market share 
increased, Japanese companies responded by increasing production in auto transplants. While a 
variety offactors could be responsible for the increased demand or preference towards Japanese 
automobiles, the fact remains that as market share increased for the Japanese, they had an 
incentive to continue that growth and increase their production in the U.S. as the model predicts. 
In trying to evaluate the results of the model, I realize that the study supports hypothesis 
two with some small reservations. First and foremost, it seems that during the times of VERs, 
only one goal existed for the Japanese companies, to increase supply which would maximize 
profits. During this period, the exchange rate was not the most important factor, and neither was 
the wage rate. However, after 1985, when the VERs expired, the Japanese companies had a 
choice. They were allowed to export as many vehicles as they wanted or they could produce 
locally. As this study has shown, Japanese companies went with the latter decision, meaning that 
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it was the most profitable for them. Multiple factors were important considerations during this 
time, factors like relative wage, and probably others that were not captured by the regression 
equation, such as parts origin and productivity issues. This differentiates it greatly from the 
period of VERs where essentially only one variable, the VER, was an issue. As for improving the 
results of hypothesis one, it proved to be intractable in my empirical estimation, again because of 
the difficulty in measuring other strategic decision variables. 
VDA Conclusion and Suggested Future Research 
This paper analyzes the introduction and rapid growth of production in Japanese auto 
transplants in the United States. Two hypotheses were developed, both of which were strongly 
developed using basic profit-maximizing motivation and supply and demand theories. However, 
only hypothesis two was supported by the results of the empirical analysis. Despite the 
unexpected results from the empirical model for hypothesis one, the results were not 
disappointing. 
Hypothesis one is best supported by theory and observation of trends in production rather 
than the empirical model in my project. In the results section, the reasons for this were discussed 
at length, but it comes down to the fact that during the VERs, the Japanese companies had one 
goal in mind: increase supply to maximize their profits that were restricted by the VERs. It is 
clear that transplant production was their answer to increase supply and increase their penetration 
of the U. S. auto market. Despite the lack of support by the empirical model, hypothesis one is 
well supported by this project. 
The second hypothesis was supported both theoretically and empirically. The results of 
the empirical model fully supported the theory that the exchange rate was responsible for 
increases in transplant production. Even stronger results could be achieved if one remembers 
that, unlike during the period of restricted imports, Japanese companies had a choice of whether 
they wanted to produce in the United States or not. In deciding to produce locally, the Japanese 
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had several factors to consider, not just one, as is the case of the VER in the early eighties. 
Although the model did not return an extremely high coefficient for the exchange rate variable 
itself, the exchange rate is till very significant in production decisions because all of these factors 
relate to the exchange rate. This is because their prices (and consequently their effect on 
company profitability) are all affected by changes in the yen/$ exchange rate. Therefore, th 
results of the model can still be interpreted to support hypothesis two since all input factors that 
encouraged Japanese companies to produce more since 1986 are affected by the exchange rate. 
In future research on this topic, an empirical model that captures more of these other 
variables would be ideal for very strong expected results. One major factor that was not able to 
be captured in the empirical model was parts considerations, such as their country of origin and 
the number of transplant producers. However, as stated earlier, finding data as specific as this is 
difficult at best. Perhaps including a productivity measure, such as unit labor cost, would be 
beneficial to the analysis also, although relative wage is a rough proxy for productivity. Other 
recommendations for the researcher with ample time and access to very specific data on the auto 
industry would be to investigate how each company was affected by the VERs individually and 
how that affected their order of entry into the us. transplant market. Another interesting avenue 
of research would be to investigate the price elasticities of demand for the Japanese companies to 
predict which models would be produced in the US. and to calculate exactly how much profits 
they were gaining or losing because of the VERs. 
This paper has addressed one of the most significant issues in the automobile industry and 
explained it with economic theory supported fairly well by empirical evidence. This study took a 
commonly observed trend in the auto industry and compiled and tested variables that help to 
explain this phenomena. Few authors have looked directly at the effects of the VERs and the 
exchange rate and how they have affected us. transplant decisions, but many have simply 
referred to the trend as given without upholding their theory. This paper has finally answered 
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with considerable certainty why the Japanese have shifted much of their production to the United 
States. The interesting results from this paper can help everyone to better understand the 
transitioning U.S. automobile industry and the factors that have contributed to its transformation. 
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